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ABSTRACT OF DISSERTATION
BROKERS AND INVESTMENT ADVISORS
Brokers and investment advisors are a large and important part of the financial
industry. Using a novel data set that includes the majority of the financial advisory
industry, in this dissertation I document the size of the financial advisory industry
and the prevalence of customer complaints in the industry, which I use as a proxy
for misconduct. I then test for two potential drivers of advisors’ misconduct: pro-
fessional standards in the form of fiduciary responsibilities and influence from social
networks. I find that variation in fiduciary duties—specifically fiduciary versus suit-
ability standards— does not appear to affect advisors’ propensity for misconduct.
My results indicate that a more likely explanation for differences between brokers
and investment advisors stems from their respective product lines and business mod-
els. I then show that advisors often influence each other’s propensity to engage
in misconduct, and that endogenous selection mechanisms, correlated environments,
and location cannot fully explain variation in misconduct across groups of co-workers.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
In this dissertation I examine misconduct by financial advisors, also referred to as
investment advisors, brokers, and registered representatives.1 While there is a long
literature on financial misconduct in a variety of forms, less is known about financial
advisors. Despite the relative lack of research on advisors compared to, for example,
mutual fund managers, financial advisors are common: With over 630,000 advisors in
the United States registered with FINRA2, there are more advisors than bartenders
or car mechanics3. Financial advisors handle trillions of dollars in assets and are
widely used by retail investors (PriceMetrix, 2015). Thus, financial advisors are an
important part of the financial system, acting as intermediaries for millions of retail
investors.
The size of the industry is indicative of a great need for financial advice due to poor
financial literacy. Studies such as Lusardi and Mitchell (2011) and van Rooij, Lusardi,
and Alessie (2011) find that most consumers in the United States are not financially
literate, and generally lack a basic understanding of financial markets, instruments,
and investment techniques. This lack of sophistication has created a large market
for financial advice aimed at retail investors—above and beyond execution-related
services such as buying and selling securities—particularly for retirement, college
expenses, and estate planning. However, a lack of sophistication on the part of
investors also means that unscrupulous advisors have many opportunities to take
advantage of their clients, in the same way that mechanics have the opportunity to
manipulate car owners.
In order to study misconduct by financial advisors empirically, I use individual and
firm-level regulatory filings obtained from Meridian IQ and state securities regulators
that allow me to observe the employers, locations, and disclosures (such as customer
complaints) of individual advisors, as well as the products and services offered by
firms. The data additionally contains examination and licensing information allowing
me to distinguish between advisors licensed to act as Registered Investment Advisors
1While the legal term is registered representative, in keeping with current literature and popular
discussion, I refer to registered representatives as advisors, except in Chapter 3 where the distinction
between investment advisors or RIAs and brokers is important.
2The Financial Industry Regulatory Authority.
3As reported by FINRA and the Bureau of Labor Statistics.
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and those that are not permitted to provide general investment advice. Certain forms
also disclose the reason for an advisor’s end of employment with a firm, allowing me
to identify when firms have merged and introduced an exogenous shock to advisors’
sets of co-workers.
I study two different potential sources of variation in advisors’ propensity to en-
gage in misconduct. In Chapter 3, I examine professional standards—specifically the
suitability and fiduciary standards to which brokers and investment advisors are re-
spectively held. This distinction has been the source of much recent debate, as the
Department of Labor has proposed and finalized new rules requiring any advisor han-
dling retirement accounts to adhere to a fiduciary standard, even if that advisor is not
a Registered Investment Advisor (RIA) licensed to provide general financial advice. I
find no evidence that applying a fiduciary standard uniformly will reduce misconduct
by advisors, because those with a fiduciary standard already receive a disproportion-
ately large amount of customer complaints, and that in many cases, advisors held to
suitability versus fiduciary standards are engaged in different businesses. This effect
is robust to firm, time, geographic, and individual-level controls, as well as controlling
for proxies for oversight. Consistent with the hypothesis that RIAs and brokers are
frequently engaged in different businesses, selection at the beginning of an advisor’s
career cannot explain the difference in misconduct rates between the two groups.
However, I do not, it should be stressed, find any evidence that imposing fiduciary
standards will increase misconduct or harm investors.
In Chapter 4 (co-authored with Stephen Dimmock and William Gerken), we ex-
amine the role of peer effects on advisors’ misconduct. While influence in social
networks or within peer groups of a causal nature is notoriously difficult to identify
empirically, the financial advisory industry has some helpful structural and reporting
features that make contagion separable from endogenous selection. We find strong
evidence that peers influence each other’s behavior, and that working with peers that
have a history of misconduct leads advisors to engage in more misconduct themselves.
These effects are stronger for advisors that are ethnically similar, which we use as a
proxy for social ties. This intuitively indicates that stronger social connections lead
to greater influence, and cannot be explained by appealing to regulation, oversight, or
wealth-related effects. These results are robust to a variety of additional controls and
alternative specifications, and cannot be explained by ’nuisance’ complaints, survival
bias, proxies for oversight and supervision, firm-level effects, geographic effects, the
financial crisis, or adaptation to new social norms.
Because investors may not be able to identify misconduct that they are the vic-
tim of, even after the fact4, it is highly likely that studies—including this one—
underestimate the prevalence and scale of misconduct by financial advisors. Mis-
conduct must be discovered and reported in order to be observed in the data, and
investors who seek out professional financial advice are generally ill-equipped to do
so.
4Financial advice falls into the category of creedence goods, which are goods whose utility is
difficult for a consumer to determine, even after purchase and consumption.
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Chapter 2
Data Description
I use data constructed from individual-level disclosures from advisors’ Form U4 and
U5 filings provided by Meridian IQ and firm-level disclosures from Form BD. While
the Financial Industry Regulatory Authority (FINRA) maintains the Central Regis-
tration Depository (CRD) from which all individual and firm data is originally drawn,
Meridian IQ collects its data from state securities regulators, as FINRA has chosen
not to make the CRD available in aggregate.1 I supplement the Meridian IQ data with
data provided by state regulators2. The data spans 1999–2014; though the data was
collected in 2014, analyses in Chapter 4 do not use mergers from 2012–2014 because
I cannot observe complaints over a sufficient period.
Not all states chose to make their portion of the CRD available to Meridian IQ,
or to turn over all disclosure files. As a result, while I have at least some data from
45 states3, only 32 of those states provide customer complaint disclosures. I use only
representatives registered in those 32 states for which I have complaints. Because a
representative must register with each state in which he or she wishes to conduct busi-
ness, many representatives are registered with all 50 states, and thus I have at least
some representatives located in all 50 states in my data. For example, North Carolina
did not provide data, so I do not observe an advisor located in Nevada that does not
do any business outside of the state, but I would observe any North Carolina-based
advisor that has registered with any of the 32 states I do observe. In total, the data
includes 522,363 representatives, and an average year has 336,588 representatives.
FINRA reports 630,692 registered representatives in the year 2010; my data includes
slightly more than half of the combined brokerage & advising industries at any given
time.
The customer complaint disclosures (part of the U4) contain detailed information
on a complaint’s resolution, the amount of damage the customer claimed, and the
amount paid to the customer in order to settle the complaint. Complaints that
1Anyone may lookup any individual representative or firm in the CRD using FINRA’s Bro-
kerCheck service at http://brokercheck.finra.org/, but FINRA does not permit bulk downloads of
the CRD.
2Data was provided by Alabama, Arkansas, California, Connecticut, Florida, Kentucky, Mary-
land, Michigan, Minnesota, Nevada, New York, Pennsylvania, Texas, Vermont, and Washington.
3Meridian IQ chose to anonymize the states providing data.
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were denied or decided in favor of the representative are typically removed from an
advisor’s record by FINRA, therefore all complaints in my data have been judged
to have some merit, either by a firm’s decision to settle monetarily before judgment
from a third party, or by an arbitration panel or court of law. Further, FINRA Rule
2080 allows complaints to be expunged if the claim was clearly erroneous. Expunged
complaints are not present in any of the data sources. Because customer complaints
are initiated by clients using a standardized process, they are unlikely to be related to
state regulators’ enforcement strategies or policies. FINRA Rule 3070 requires firms
to report all written customer complaints to regulators via the CRD system, though
customers may choose to file complaints directly with FINRA or the relevant state
regulator(s).
FINRA classifies4 complaints that go to arbitration into a number of categories
which are not mutually exclusive. These categories include breach of fiduciary duty,
negligence, failure to supervise, misrepresentation, suitability breach of contract,
omission of facts, fraud, unauthorized trading, and churning. A complaint regarding
churning, for example, means that the advisor (allegedly) deliberately traded for a
customer’s account unnecessarily, usually in order to generate trading fees. Misrepre-
sentation and omission of facts are very common allegations in customer complaints,
and are difficult for customers to identify; a customer may never realize that they were
misled or that an advisor omitted important facts about a security or that an advisor
concealed a conflict of interest such as kick-backs or bonuses for certain securities.
It is also important to note that while customers may allege a variety of misconduct
types, this does not mean that an advisor engaged in all of these behaviors, even if
the complaint is upheld. Customers may deliberately add as many allegations to their
complaint as possible in order to pressure advisors to settle or to increase the apparent
seriousness of the complaint. However, a complaint that is upheld (or settled prior
to arbitration) is very likely to represent significant damage to a customer and/or
serious ethical violations, otherwise advisors will likely have the complaint expunged
from their record. I use customer complaints as a measure of financial misconduct by
advisors throughout this dissertation.
Some papers, such as Qureshi and Sokobin (2015); Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2016);
McCann, Qin, and Yan (2016) also use regulatory actions either as a separate measure
of misconduct or added to customer complaints. I deliberately exclude regulatory ac-
tions for the following reasons: First, regulatory actions are not necessarily related to
financial misconduct against customers, e.g., sanctions for record-keeping violations.
Second, some regulatory actions cite the same actions that brought on a customer
complaint, effectively double-counting misconduct and, due to differences in filing
dates, potentially creating a “pattern” of misconduct from a single event. Finally,
regulators are aware of customer complaints from branches and may choose to inves-
tigate or audit members of a branch that received complaints recently, producing the
illusion of peer effects (see Chapter 4) where none exist.
Using the Series 65 & 66 exams to identify advisors classifies 247,458 of 522,363
4As of September of 2016, summary statistics are available from FINRA at
https://www.finra.org/arbitration-and-mediation/dispute-resolution-statistics.
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representatives (47.4%) in my sample as advisors; by comparison, using the cross-
section of all advisors registered with the SEC as of July 2014 and comparing against
FINRA’s official statistics indicates that 48.5% of representatives were advisors in
2014 (308,897 advisors from the SEC and 636,707 representatives from FINRA). From
this I conclude that series exams are an effective method of identifying financial
advisors.
Advisory firms operate from a number of geographically separate branches. The
U4 filings provide the street address of a branch as well as a branch identifier that is
unique within a firm. From this I can identify all the members of a specific branch
and its exact location. Since the U4 also provides the dates at which an advisor joined
and left a branch, at any given time I can observe the complete makeup of any branch
in any firm in the data.
Meridian IQ provides assets under management (AUM) for a subset of advisors.
While valuable as a control variable, the AUM provided is available only as a cross-
section observed in 2014. As a result, detailed analysis of AUM and its determinants
is not feasible.
Detailed summary and descriptive statistics are provided and discussed in the
following two chapters.
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Chapter 3
Brokers vs Advisors: The Fiduciary
Standard
The legal distinction between broker-dealers and investment advisors has been a pop-
ular topic, particularly since February of 2015 when the Department of Labor sug-
gested extending the fiduciary standard required of investment advisors to brokers
handling retirement products.1 At issue is whether brokers handling retirement prod-
ucts should be required to meet the fiduciary standard (to act in the best interests
of the client) or whether the suitability standard (offer products that meet the goals
and means of a client) is sufficient. Proponents of the rule change implicitly as-
sume that investment advisors provide better service to their clients because of their
professional standard of conduct, and if that standard were imposed on brokers, bro-
kers’ behavior would improve. However, investment advisors—who are slightly less
than half of all registered representatives2—receive more than three-quarters of all
customer complaints about misconduct or fraudulent sales practices, which suggests
that if professional standards affect representatives’ behavior, the effect is dominated
by other factors. I refer to this difference in the rates of complaints as the “advisor
effect”.
I test whether the fiduciary standard can explain the advisor effect, examine pre-
dictors of complaints by representatives, and model the decision to become an advisor
versus a broker. While a variety of factors significantly predict customer complaints
(see, for example, Dimmock and Gerken (2012), which examines fraud by investment
managers and finds that past behavior, conflicts of interest, variation in monitoring,
and managers’ demographics are all correlated with fraud), I find no evidence that
the advisor effect is driven by fiduciary duties.
Another assumption implicit to the argument for extending the fiduciary standard
is that advisors and brokers are essentially offering the same products and services,
instead of being in significantly different lines of business. If both groups are in the
same business and directly compete with one another in most or all markets, it would
make sense for the two groups to have the same standard of conduct. However,
1These rules have since been finalized and are scheduled to take effect in 2017.
2Registered representatives are the broader group to which both brokers and advisors belong.
All individuals in my data are registered representatives, and all are either an advisor or a broker.
6
if brokers are primarily engaged in arms-length transactions with customers while
advisors provide services to clients on a basis of trust, then it makes little sense for
brokers and advisors to be bound by the same professional standards.
In fact, brokers and advisors work at different types of firms, though there is
significant overlap. When I compare brokers and advisors working at similar firm
types (which I identify as firms offering the same products and services), I find little
difference between the rates at which the two groups receive customer complaints.
Additionally, when using the cross-sectional set of complaints to examine whether a
complaint went to a broker or an advisor, I find that the direction and magnitude of
the advisor effect is highly sensitive to the choice of products to control for: Control-
ling for whether the representative was at a mutual fund retailer reverses the advisor
effect. The advisor effect can be explained entirely by firm-level product lines; as
a result, the role of professional standards in preventing or limiting misconduct is
unclear.
Further, some states (California, Missouri, South Dakota, and South Carolina)
already impose a fiduciary standard on all registered representatives located in their
states, providing a natural quasi-experiment. I find that the advisor effect in these
“fiduciary states” is no different from the effect in non-fiduciary states. More general
models using state or zip-code level fixed effects do not explain the advisor effect;
location is not significantly correlated with the advisor effect. Alternatively, it is
possible that brokers and advisors have different clientele, and that advisors’ clients
are better informed (more able to identify misconduct) and have greater means (more
able to afford legal representation). While I cannot directly observe clients, brokers
and advisors have similar assets under management, and controlling for AUM does
not explain the advisor effect. It is possible that an advisor may not have a fiduciary
duty to all of their accounts, acting as a broker to some of their clients and an advisor
to others. If these arrangements are common, it would be difficult to understand how
fiduciary duties—or the lack thereof—could drive differences in misconduct rates, but
it would make the identification of representatives subject to the fiduciary standard
more difficult.
An alternative hypothesis proposed by Gough (2014) is that the higher standard
imposed on advisors lowers the threshold for lodging a successful complaint relative
to making a complaint against a broker. The lowered threshold hypothesis is difficult
to motivate given the results in the fiduciary states. It is possible that a higher stan-
dard of conduct manifests itself in higher settlements paid out to customers in order
to resolve complaints, as misconduct on the part of a fiduciary could be considered
more egregious when compared to misconduct in the course of a normal business
relationship, instead of resulting in a greater number of successful complaints. How-
ever, customer payouts for advisors are slightly smaller than those for brokers, despite
advisors receiving a higher amount of damage claimed. A lower threshold for com-
plaints due to the fiduciary standard does not explain the advisor effect and is not
well-supported by the data.
Investment advisors are, understandably, concentrated in firms that focus on retail
products offered to individual consumers, as opposed to brokers, who can be found in
nearly all financial firms. When advisors are compared to brokers in similar firms, the
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rates at which they receive complaints are very similar, suggesting that professional
standards have little effect on misconduct among registered representatives. While I
find no evidence that imposing the fiduciary standard on retail brokers would reduce
misconduct, I also find no evidence that it would be harmful—brokers in fiduciary
states receive complaints at a rate very similar to brokers in non-fiduciary states. My
findings indicate that broadening the application of the fiduciary standard will have
little effect on the behavior of brokers. Because my data does not contain information
about clients or advisors’ compensation structures, I cannot address concerns about
reduced access to advisors (Litan and Singer, 2015).
Regardless of the advisor effect, many clients may be better off with an advisor
instead of a broker; Finke, Huston, and Waller (2009) show that the clients of advisors
frequently possess better insurance coverage than the customers of brokers, which is
consistent with my findings that show that advisors handling life insurance receive
fewer customer complaints than brokers who handle life insurance. Mehran and Stulz
(2007) consider scenarios where conflicts of interest may result in benefits to both
parties, and Emons (1997) shows that market mechanisms may be sufficient to induce
sellers of credence goods to avoid fraudulent behavior. The equilibria that Emons
describes involve a separation between diagnosis and repair and generally require that
experts do not have excess capacity, the first of which is analogous to a separation
between financial advice on the one hand and execution and portfolio management
on the other. While advisors that only offer counseling exist, they do not appear to
dominate the market, and since customers will still require execution and advisors
may have (undisclosed) relationships with brokers, it is not clear that limiting advisors
to counseling necessarily reduce misconduct. It is also unlikely that financial advisors
generally operate at maximum capacity at all times, so they may still have an incentive
to provide execution and management services in order to increase revenues.
Because advisors and brokers likely have better information than many of their
customers (Lusardi and Mitchell, 2011), and I find that the advisor effect varies
according to products and services, it is likely that the optimal contract3 from an
investor’s standpoint depends on both the investor’s goals and financial sophistication.
3.1 Background on Brokers and Advisors
I use the term registered representative or simply representative to refer to anyone
authorized to transact for or provide investment or financial advice to a customer. All
individuals in my sample are representatives. In the terminology used by FINRA, a
broker (or usually a broker-dealer) refers to a firm that acts as a broker and/or dealer
for financial securities. Likewise, FINRA uses the term advisor to refer to a firm
3See Spence and Zeckhauser (1971) or Harris and Raviv (1979) for more general discussions of
optimal contracting between principals and agents under asymmetric information. Spence (1977)
considers cases where consumer misperception affects product markets. La Porta, Lopez-de Silanes,
and Shleifer (2006) considers regulations regarding securities transactions and examines their effec-
tiveness under asymmetric information, however they do not discuss credence good markets, where
the buyer lacks not just information but also the sophistication necessary to use it.
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that provides financial advisory services to clients. However, the common usage of
broker and advisor refers to individuals (registered representatives) that, respectively,
provide brokerage services or financial advice to clients on behalf of their employer.
For simplicity, I refer to representative as a broker if that individual is not authorized
to provide financial advice, and as an advisor if that individual is authorized to
provide financial advice.
To become an advisor, a representative must pass either the Series 65 or Series 66
exam4. I thereby classify any representative that has passed either of the Series 65
or 66 exams as an advisor. The remainder of the representatives in my sample are
classified as brokers. Classifying representatives as brokers before their exam date
does not alter the results of my analysis substantially.
When providing financial advice, an advisor must adhere to what is often referred
to as the fiduciary standard, which requires that advisors put the interests of their
clients ahead of their own, and that advice given be in the client’s best interest.5
Further, any agent with a fiduciary duty is required to avoid conflicts of interest
relevant to their principals and may not profit from the relationship without their
principal’s knowledge and consent. Other examples of principal-agent relationships
with a fiduciary duty include corporate officers acting for shareholders, attorneys and
their clients, executors of estates, and parents or legal guardians of children. Financial
advice is frequently a credence good (meaning that the buyer is never—even ex post—
certain of the value or utility of the product they purchase) because a sophisticated
investor, by definition, does not require advice from a third party.6 Advisors’ clients
are generally not sophisticated investors. Credence goods increase the opportunity
for misconduct on the part of seller and make monitoring inherently difficult (Emons,
1997).
By contrast, a broker is bound by a looser standard often referred to as the
suitability standard, which requires only that the products offered to a client meet the
means and goals of the client. For example, if a client wishes to save for retirement, a
broker may offer stocks, bonds, annuities, or mutual funds7 in any mixture or quantity
that the client can afford. An advisor, by contrast, would need to consider whether,
e.g., that specific client is better off investing in one or more mutual funds, and
exactly which mutual funds are that client’s best option before dispensing advice. A
discount brokerage, on the other hand, could be said to meet the suitability standard
once a client has provided funds and given an order to buy or sell a security. Having
the necessary funds to purchase (or cover the sale of) a security meets the means
requirement, and issuing a buy or sell order meets the goals requirement as the client
4A representative that has already passed the Series 7 in order to become a general securities
representative—what is generically considered a broker—has the option to take the Series 66 in lieu
of taking both the Series 63 and Series 65 exams. A broker that does not wish to become an advisor
need only take the Series 63 exam.
5See Easterbrook and Fischel (1993) for a more general discussion of fiduciary duty in the context
of contract law.
6A sophisticated investor may not be in possession of all the relevant information, but this is
different from requiring advice in order to evaluate information.
7This is not necessarily a comprehensive list of the securities that could meet the goal of saving
for retirement, but it covers the vast majority of the securities a broker would offer such a client.
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can be said to have the goal of taking a position with respect to that security. For
a sophisticated investor, it is unclear whether the suitability standard provides any
value, as the investor likely does not care about the broker’s assessment of suitability,
and the standard does not necessarily increase information disclosure to the investor.
3.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 3.1 shows summary statistics for individuals and complaints. While there are
slightly fewer advisors than brokers in my data, the overwhelming majority of com-
plaints went to advisors (69.7%). I refer to this difference in complaint rates as as
the “advisor effect”—the unconditional effect on the rate at which a registered repre-
sentative receives customer complaints due to being a investment advisor. 8 Brokers
pay out somewhat more ($241,000 versus $177,000) to settle a complaint than advi-
sors, though advisors’ clients claim larger damages ($645,000 versus $551,000). The
payouts and claims averages do not include complaints resolved without disclosing a
cash settlement 9 (i.e., payout must be greater than 0 for a complaint to be included
in the payout and damage claimed averages). There is considerable variation in both
payouts and damage claims, and the differences between advisors and brokers are
neither economically or statistically significant. Brokers and advisors manage similar
amounts ($95 versus $119 million in AUM10), and have similar proportions of men
versus women.
In order to form a year-representative panel, I observe what firm(s) a represen-
tative was employed at during each year; when a representative was employed at
multiple firms during a calendar year, I assign that representative to the firm em-
ploying the most representatives during that year, i.e., to the largest firm. Table 3.2
shows the pooled means for variables in the panel. Advisors and brokers have similar
average ages and years of experience (42.3 versus 43.8 years and 10.99 versus 11.43
years, respectively). I calculate experience at a given time as the number of days from
a rep’s earliest starting date divided by 365.24 to get the number of years of experi-
ence as a registered representative. A greater proportion of advisors are employed at
firms offering investment advice, selling mutual funds, and variable life insurance or
variable annuities11. A greater proportion of brokers than advisors are employed at
firms offering private placements.
Table 3.3 shows counts of representatives in fiduciary and non-fiduciary states over
time and the number of complaints received for each. The number of representatives
8Recent work by McCann, Qin, and Yan (2016) and Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2016) find similar
differences between brokers and advisors.
9For many complaints showing a 0 settlement amount, the terms of the settlement—including
the amount paid to the client—are confidential. Defendants (representatives and their attorneys)
cannot propose keeping the settlement confidential in exchange for a larger amount, but plaintiffs
or their attorneys can.
10AUM is provided by Meridian IQ for a limited subset of brokers and advisors, and is observed
only in 2014. By comparison, PriceMetrix (2015) reports that the average advisor managed $97
million in 2014.
11Variable life insurance & annuities is a single category on Form BD.
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in both fiduciary and non-fiduciary states are fairly stable over time, with only minor
variation. Customer complaints, however, vary substantially; years with economic
growth (e.g., 2005 and 2012) have relatively few complaints, while years during re-
cessions (e.g., 2001, 2008, and 2009) receive a relatively large number of complaints.
Customers are likely more motivated to examine their portfolio’s performance during
an economic downturn, after their investments have lost value. Table 3.4 scales com-
plaints by the number of representatives to more directly examine whether there are
differences in misconduct rates between fiduciary and non-fiduciary states. Miscon-
duct rates vary over time in the same way counts in Table 3.3 do, but the observed
rates in fiduciary and non-fiduciary states are nearly identical. Testing the differences
in rates rarely show statistical significance and the sign of the difference varies from
year to year, indicating that there is no systematic difference between misconduct
rates in fiduciary and non-fiduciary states. In the multivariate tests below, I address
time variation in misconduct rates using year fixed effects.
3.3 Testing the Fiduciary Standard and the Effects
of Product Lines
To test for whether the advisor effect persists in a multivariate setting, I use a panel
of all representatives, and, similar to Dimmock and Gerken (2012), predict how many
complaints a representative will receive in year t+ 1 using variables observed in year
t. Because age, sex, and AUM are not provided for many reps, I set missing values
for those variables equal to 0 and include a missingness indicator for each variable.
The missingness indicators are omitted from tables that use them in the interest of
brevity. I use these missingness indicators in any model that includes demographic
and AUM controls. Additionally, I also control for industry experience, measured as
the number of years since a representative first entered the industry. 12
Four states (California, Missouri, South Dakota, and South Carolina) impose a
fiduciary duty on brokers in addition to advisors.13 Much of the advisory business
is local, based on personal relationships, and thus moving to another state to avoid
fiduciary requirements is likely to incur both direct moving costs and lose customers.
This state-level variation in fiduciary duties for brokers provides an opportunity to
directly test for whether the advisor effect is due to the fiduciary standard, and
to address a current debate regarding the imposition of the fiduciary standard on
brokers who handle retirement products. If fiduciary duties are driving differences in
the behaviors of advisors and brokers, states with uniform standards should show no
difference between the two groups.14
12Brown and Minor (2013) suggest that more experienced agents are more likely to take advantage
of their clients.
13See Gough (2014) for further discussion of state-level variation in fiduciary duties. He does not,
however, use this variation to test for the effect of the fiduciary standard, as he only has data for
the state of Florida.
14Hankins, Flannery, and Nimalendran (2008) raises the possibility that the state the client is
located in may determine the legal standard applied to a principle-agent relationship, rather than the
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Table 3.5 shows linear fixed effects models in which attempt to predict the number
of complaints a representative will receive in the following year. In Column 1 I begin
with a model including only an indicator for whether the representative is an advisor,
demographic controls, and year fixed effects, in order to establish the relative size
of the advisor effect in the panel. The coefficient on Advisor is 0.006, and is highly
significant.15
Column 2 adds an indicator for whether the representative was located in a fidu-
ciary state in year t and an interaction with Advisor. If fiduciary duties cause the
advisor effect, we would expect the interaction between Advisor and Fiduciary State
to be negative (the opposite of the coefficient on Advisor) and of a magnitude sim-
ilar to Advisor, so that the interaction cancels out the advisor effect in fiduciary
states. However, both Fiduciary State and its interaction with Advisor are small and
insignificant. Representatives in fiduciary states receive insignificantly more com-
plaints than other reps (0.0003) and advisors in fiduciary states receive insignificantly
fewer (−0.0001) complaints than advisors in other states. The coefficient on Advisor
remains 0.006, unchanged from Column 1.
In Column 3 I add firm fixed effects and interaction terms16 for the employing
firm’s product lines to Advisor instead of the demographic and AUM controls. The
product line interactions I use are investment advisory, private placements, variable
life insurance & annuities, dealing or brokering debt securities (corporate, municipal,
or federal), and mutual fund retailer. As a result, the coefficient on Advisor becomes
negative and marginally significant (−0.001). The coefficients on Fiduciary State
and its interaction with Advisor are unaffected. Advisors at firms handling debt,
advisory firms, and mutual fund retailers receive complaints at a significantly higher
rate (0.002, 0.004, and 0.003, respectively). By contrast, advisors at firms handling
variable life insurance & annuities receive complaints at a lower rate (−0.002, sig-
nificant at the 10% level), and advisors at firms handling private placements receive
complaints at an insignificantly lower rate (−0.0004).
The decomposition of the advisor effect in Column 3 suggests that there is no
generic, industry-wide effect to advisors, but rather a range of positive and negative
effects depending on the products and services offered. From this we can speculate
that some products might allow a representative greater opportunity or incentives
for misconduct, perhaps due to kick-backs for flows from mutual funds or bonuses
for selling in-house products discretion or have a relatively less sophisticated clientele
who have difficulty monitoring their representative. Clients needing an advisor to
guide their investment in mutual funds are likely to be less sophisticated or informed
than clients who only require a the services of a broker, meaning that those clients are
state the agent in which the agent is located. However, this was in the context of differing fiduciary
standards, instead of suitability versus fiduciary standards. In the same context, Schanzenbach and
Sitkoff (2007) concluded that the principle’s location determined the relevant legal standard, and
not the client’s location.
15Standard errors are computed using multi-way clustering following Cameron, Gelbach, and
Miller (2011) in all regressions; see the tables for the dimensions used for clustering in each regression.
16I use interaction terms for product lines because firm fixed effects will absorb firm product lines
in general, as product lines do not vary over time in the data.
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less able to oversee their advisor’s behavior or see through a misleading sales pitch.
From Table 3.5 we can conclude that state-level imposition of fiduciary duties
on brokers has little or no effect on the rate at which they receive complaints, but
firm lines of products and services offered do. As advisors in important and common
areas such as mutual fund sales receive complaints at a higher rate than brokers, and
because the fiduciary standard does not appear to affect the rate at which a repre-
sentative receives customer complaints, there is little evidence that the imposition
of fiduciary duties on brokers at the federal level will significantly affect misconduct
among brokers.
3.4 Large Payouts and the Cross-section of Com-
plaints
While fiduciary duties do not appear to affect misconduct rates, it is possible that
fiduciary duties affect the severity of the complaint. Gough (2014) suggests that
fiduciary duties may decrease the threshold for lodging a successful complaint against
an advisor relative to a broker. If misconduct by a fiduciary is considered more
egregious than misconduct by an agent in an arms-length transaction, then advisors
might be punished more severely than brokers by arbitration boards, or clients might
demand larger settlements from advisors than they demand from brokers. I explore
this possibility in Table 3.6, where I use logit models estimated using quasi-maximum
likelihood estimation17. I use only complaints to those representatives for which firm-
level product line data is available, reducing the number of observations to 39,708
from 58,315.
The dependent variable for all columns in Table 3.6 is an indicator equal to 1 if the
complaint was settled by a payout to the customer of $25,000 or more, and 0 otherwise.
If fiduciary standards lead to larger payouts to satisfy clients and arbitration boards,
we would expect the coefficient on Advisor to be positive and significant. In Column
1 I estimate a model using only a constant term and an indicator for whether the
representative receiving the complaint is an advisor. The constant term is small and
negative (-0.052) but highly significant, as a slight majority of complaints are settled
with a small payout or no payout at all. The coefficient on Advisor is negative and
insignificant (-0.020); advisors are no more likely to settle with a large payout than
brokers.
Because Table 3.5 demonstrates that product lines are important to understanding
misconduct rates, in Column 2 I add indicators for several product lines (mutual fund
dealer, variable life insurance & annuities (VLA), private placements, brokering or
dealing any form of debt securities, investment advisory). As a state’s policy with
respect to fiduciary duties for brokers may be relevant, I include an indicator for
whether a representative is located in a fiduciary state at the time of the complaint.
Advisor remains negative and insignificant (-0.005). Fiduciary State is also negative
and insignificant (-0.031), indicating that reps in fiduciary states do not settle with
17See Wooldridge (1997) for a description of QMLE and a comparison to standard MLE techniques.
13
large payouts any more often than reps in other states. All of the product indicators
are highly significant. Being employed at an investment advisory firm is correlated
with small payouts (-0.200, e−0.2 = 0.819 or about 18% less likely to settle with
a large payout), being employed at a mutual fund retailer is also negative (-0.481,
e−0.481 = 0.618 or about 38% less likely to settle with a large payout), as is being
employed at a VLA dealer (-0.209, e−0.209 = 0.811 or about 19% less likely to settle
with a large payout). Private placements is positive (0.263, e0.263 = 1.301 or about
30% more likely to settle with a large payout), as is handling debt securities (0.420,
e0.420 = 1.522 or about 52% more likely to settle with a large payout).
In Column 3 I add demographic controls (age, experience, sex, and log(AUM)),
but the results are quantitatively similar to Column 2. One interesting aspect of
the payout results is that categories (advisory firm, mutual fund retailer) where ad-
visors receive more complaints than brokers are correlated with smaller settlements,
whereas categories (private placements, debt securities) where advisors receive fewer
complaints than brokers are correlated with larger settlements; the advisor effect
appears to be negatively correlated with settlement size.
3.5 Choosing to be an Advisor
While the previous sections have considered the rate at which representatives receive
complaints, in this section I consider a rep’s decision to become an advisor in addition
to or instead of being a broker. In Table 3.7 I model this decision using a logit
model, where the dependent variable is whether a representative becomes an advisor
or not. All variables are observed at the beginning of a representative’s career. I
include indicators for all the previous product and service categories (mutual fund
dealer, variable life insurance & annuities (VLA), private placements, brokering or
dealing any form of debt securities, and investment advisory), as well as whether
the representative is male, and the age the representative entered the industry. I
also include fixed effects for the year a representative started their career to control
for variation over time in the broker-advisor decision, and state-level fixed effects to
control for potential geographic effects. I include only representatives for whom I
have non-missing firm-level product line information about their first firm.
Table 3.7 indicates that men are more likely to become advisors than women,
representatives who begin their careers earlier in life are less likely to become an
advisor, and starting a career at a mutual fund dealer, a VLA dealer, a firm handling
debt securities, or an investment advisory is associated with a greater likelihood
of becoming an advisor; all are highly statistically significant. Working at a firm
handling private placements is insignificantly associated with a greater likelihood of
becoming an advisor.
Using the model of the broker-advisor decision estimated in Table 3.7, I construct
a propensity score matched set of brokers and advisors. Specifically, I use nearest-
neighbor matching with replacement to find the broker that is most similar to each
advisor. As shown in Table 3.8, starting with 346,389 representatives, I match 59,285
brokers to 160,572 advisors (no advisors go unmatched). I then compare the rates
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at which advisors and brokers receive complaints over their full careers in both the
matched and unmatched samples. An advisor receives an average of 0.129 complaints
over the course of their career, whereas brokers in general receive an average of 0.043
complaints (for a difference of 0.086 complaints). The matched brokers, however,
receive 0.084 complaints in their careers (for a difference of 0.043 complaints). While
selection at the beginning of a career accounts for approximately half of the uncondi-
tional advisor effect, there is still a substantial difference in complaint rates between
advisors and matched brokers.
A multivariate test of differences in career misconduct rates, shown in Table 3.9,
finds little difference in the advisor effect between the matched and unmatched sam-
ples, demonstrating that even if brokers and advisors begin their careers under similar
circumstances, their misconduct rates still differ.
3.6 Location and Proxies for Oversight
While the advisor effect varies considerably from one type of product to another,
it is possible that the effect could be explained by other factors. In Table 3.10 I
present models controlling for other firm and branch characteristics. In particular,
I use measures of firm and branch size, along with indicators for where a represen-
tative is supervised from to proxy for the amount of oversight a firm imposes on a
representative. In Column 1 I control for (log) firm size, (log) branch size, their inter-
action, indicators for whether the firm or branch is a “solo” operation (Solo Firm for
firms with only one representative and Solo Branch for branches with only one rep-
resentative), for whether the branch is a Private Residence, and for whether the rep’s
supervisor is not located at the same branch as the representative (Unsupervised). I
also include demographic and AUM controls, as in Table 3.5.
Other than firm size (which is positive at 0.001), none of the firm or branch
controls is significantly different from 0, and the coefficient on Advisor is essentially
unchanged from Table 3.5 Column 2 at 0.004. While it is possible that other, better
proxies for oversight could correlate with complaints or even explain the advisor effect,
size and the relative location of supervision do not.
In Table 3.10 Column 2 I add fixed effects for each 5-digit zip code a representa-
tive’s office is located in; while state-level variation in fiduciary duties do not explain
the advisor effect, it is possible that the effect is correlated more generally with ge-
ographic location. The R2 doubles from 0.004 to 0.008 when I account for zip code
fixed effects, indicating that complaints in general are clustered in certain areas. This
is consistent with Eaglesham and Barry (2014), who find that complaints are dispro-
portionately more likely in areas with many elderly investors and, studies that find
that misconduct is often concentrated in specific geographic areas (Egan, Matvos, and
Seru, 2016; Parsons, Sulaeman, and Titman, 2015). Otherwise, the results in Col-
umn 2 are essentially unchanged from Column 1, suggesting that while complaints
are correlated with location, the advisor effect is not. Column 3 shows the results of
a simpler model, similar to Column 2 of Table 3.5 but with the addition of zip code
fixed effects, which shows that brokers and advisors in fiduciary states are similar to
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those in non-fiduciary states after controlling for fine-grained geographic effects.
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3.7 Tables
Table 3.1: Individual and Complaint Summary Statistics
Comparisons of brokers and advisors. Total Number is the number of representatives of that
type observed in the data. AUM is Assets Under Management. Male is equal to 1 if the
representative is male. Number of Complaints per Rep is the Total Number of Complaints
received divided by the Total Number. Mean Payout, measured in thousands of dollars, is
the average amount paid to clients as either a settlement or as required by an arbitration
panel. Mean Damage Claimed, measured in thousands of dollars, is the average amount
of damages clients claimed to have experienced as a result of the representative’s actions.
Total Number of Complaints is a count of the number of customer complaints observed in
the sample.
Brokers Advisors
Total Number 274, 905 247, 458
Mean AUM (millions) 95.10 118.88
Male 0.74 0.78
Number of Complaints per Rep 0.06 0.16
Mean Payout (thousands) 241 177
Mean Damage Claimed (thousands) 551 645
Total Number of Complaints 17, 670 40, 645
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Table 3.2: Panel Means
Comparisons of brokers and advisors in a panel spanning 2001–2012. AUM is Assets Under
Management in millions of dollars. Age and Experience are in years, measured as the number
of days from birth or the first observed date of employment, divided by 365.24. Male is equal
to 1 if the representative is male. RIA Firm, Mutual Fund Retailer, Variable Life Insurance
& Annuities, and Private Placements are equal to 1 if the representative was employed at a
firm during that year offering that product or service.
Brokers Advisors
AUM 31.19 65.33
Age 43.81 42.30
Experience 11.34 10.99
Male 0.58 0.74
RIA Firm 0.54 0.66
Mutual Fund Retailer 0.67 0.73
Variable Life Insurance & Annuities 0.58 0.69
Private Placements 0.33 0.24
18
Table 3.3: Representatives in Fiduciary and Non-Fiduciary States
Number of complaints in each year of the sample. Fiduciary States are California, Missouri,
South Carolina, and South Dakota, which impose fiduciary duties on brokers. All other
states are Other States. Complaints is the number of customer complaints filed during that
year.
Fiduciary States Other States
Year Complaints Representatives Complaints Representatives
2001 438 46, 105 2, 246 270, 225
2002 294 48, 297 1, 742 280, 393
2003 238 49, 465 1, 358 284, 688
2004 186 49, 968 1, 102 287, 699
2005 165 50, 138 805 287, 979
2006 132 49, 187 743 282, 053
2007 818 49, 785 4, 929 285, 356
2008 1, 154 49, 868 6, 409 285, 297
2009 733 49, 813 4, 428 285, 112
2010 623 51, 106 3, 443 291, 580
2011 488 52, 132 2, 648 297, 737
2012 304 52, 744 1, 541 302, 331
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Table 3.4: Misconduct Rates in Fiduciary and Non-Fiduciary States
Rate of complaints in each year of the sample. Fiduciary States are California, Missouri,
South Carolina, and South Dakota, which impose fiduciary duties on brokers. All other
states are Other States. The rates indicated are the number of complaints divided by the
number of representatives in the sample during that year.
Complaints per Representative
Year Fiduciary States Other States Difference
2001 0.010 0.008 0.001∗∗
2002 0.006 0.006 −0.0001
2003 0.005 0.005 0.00004
2004 0.004 0.004 −0.0001
2005 0.003 0.003 0.0005∗
2006 0.003 0.003 0.00005
2007 0.016 0.017 −0.001
2008 0.023 0.022 0.001
2009 0.015 0.016 −0.001
2010 0.012 0.012 0.0004
2011 0.009 0.009 0.0005
2012 0.006 0.005 0.001∗
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Table 3.5: Panel Tests of the Fiduciary Standard
Linear fixed effects models where the dependent variable, the number of complaints a rep-
resentative received, is measured in year t, while all explanatory variables are measured in
year t− 1. The sample spans 2001–2012. Firm Investment Advisory, Mutual Fund Retailer,
VLA Dealer, Private Placements, and Other Products are indicators equal to 1 if the rep’s
firm offered that product, where VLA means variable life insurance and annuities. Debt is
equal to 1 if the firm brokers or deals corporate, municipal, or government debt securities.
Fiduciary State is equal to 1 if the complaint went to a representative located in a state
with uniform fiduciary duties. Standard errors clustered by year and individual in columns
1 and 2, and clustered by year, firm, and individual in column 3 are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3)
Advisor 0.006∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗ −0.001∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
Fiduciary State 0.0003 0.0003
(0.0003) (0.0003)
Advisor at Debt 0.002∗∗∗
(0.001)
Advisor at Advisory Firm 0.004∗∗∗
(0.001)
Advisor at Placements −0.0004
(0.001)
Advisor at VLA Dealer −0.002∗
(0.001)
Advisor at Mutual Retailer 0.003∗∗
(0.001)
Advisor:Fid State −0.0001 −0.0001
(0.0005) (0.0005)
Age, Exp, Sex, AUM Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Firm Fixed Effects No No Yes
Observations 3,447,948 3,447,948 3,447,948
R2 0.005 0.005 0.009
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.6: Determinants of a Large Payout
Logit model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the complaint was settled by a pay-
out to the customer of $25,000 or more, and 0 if not. Age and Experience are standardized/z-
scored and measured at date of the complaint. Firm Investment Advisory, Mutual Fund
Retailer, VLA Dealer, Private Placements, and Other Products are indicators equal to 1 if
the rep’s firm offered that product, where VLA means variable life insurance and annuities.
Any Debt Securities is equal to 1 if the firm brokers or deals corporate, municipal, or govern-
ment debt securities. Fiduciary State is equal to 1 if the complaint went to a representative
located in a state with uniform fiduciary duties. Standard errors in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant −0.052∗∗∗ 0.167∗ −0.853∗∗∗
(0.019) (0.085) (0.117)
Advisor −0.020 −0.005 0.017
(0.022) (0.023) (0.024)
Firm Investment Advisory −0.200∗∗∗ −0.201∗∗∗
(0.032) (0.033)
Mutual Fund Retailer −0.481∗∗∗ −0.469∗∗∗
(0.091) (0.091)
VLA Dealer −0.209∗∗∗ −0.169∗∗∗
(0.049) (0.049)
Private Placements 0.263∗∗∗ 0.233∗∗∗
(0.027) (0.027)
Any Debt Securities 0.420∗∗∗ 0.451∗∗∗
(0.064) (0.064)
Fiduciary State −0.031 −0.027
(0.028) (0.028)
Age, Exp, Sex, AUM No No Yes
Observations 39,708 39,708 39,708
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.7: Determinants of Becoming an Advisor
Logit model where the dependent variable is equal to 1 if the representative was an advisor,
0 if a broker. Age at Start is standardized/z-scored and measured at date of the start of
the representative’s career. Firm Investment Advisory, Mutual Fund Retailer, VLA Dealer,
Private Placements, and Any Debt Securities are indicators equal to 1 if the rep’s first firm
offered that product, where VLA means variable life insurance and annuities. Any Debt
Securities is equal to 1 if the firm brokers or deals corporate, municipal, or government debt
securities. Standard errors in parentheses.
Male 0.062∗∗∗
(0.002)
log(AUM) 0.091∗∗∗
(0.002)
Age at Start −0.022∗∗∗
(0.001)
Firm Investment Advisory 0.158∗∗∗
(0.002)
Mutual Fund Retailer 0.042∗∗∗
(0.003)
VLA Dealer 0.063∗∗∗
(0.003)
Private Placements 0.002
(0.002)
Any Debt Securities 0.023∗∗∗
(0.003)
Start-Year Fixed Effects Yes
Start-State Fixed Effects Yes
Observations 346,389
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.8: Univariate Complaint Rates Between Matched Advisors and Brokers
Univariate tests of the difference in complaint rates between advisors and brokers, using
matched and unmatched samples. The unmatched test include all representatives for which
firm product information is available at the start of the rep’s career (all reps included in Table
3.7), and uses Welch’s t-test. The matched test includes all advisors and those brokers to
which they’ve been matched (matching nearest neighbor with replacement using the model
from Table 3.7), and uses a paired t-test.
Panel A: Number of Unique Individuals by Sample
Advisors Brokers
Unmatched 160,572 185,817
Matched 160,572 59,285
Panel B: Full Career Complaint Rates by Sample
Advisors Brokers Difference t
Unmatched 0.129 0.043 0.086∗∗∗ 49.83
Matched 0.129 0.084 0.045∗∗∗ 23.80
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Table 3.9: Misconduct Rates Between Matched Advisors and Brokers
Linear fixed effects model where the dependent variable is the number of complaints a repre-
sentative received during his or her career. All variables are observed at the start of the rep’s
career except AUM, which is observed in 2014 if available. Age at Start is standardized/z-
scored and measured at date of the start of the rep’s career. Firm Investment Advisory,
Mutual Fund Retailer, VLA Dealer, Private Placements, and Any Debt Securities are indi-
cators equal to 1 if the representative’s first firm offered that product, where VLA means
variable life insurance and annuities. Any Debt Securities is equal to 1 if the firm brokers
or deals corporate, municipal, or government debt securities. Standard errors clustered by
starting state in the unmatched and by starting state, individual, and by match in paren-
theses.
Unmatched Matched
Advisor 0.049∗∗∗ 0.055∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
Male 0.066∗∗∗ 0.076∗∗∗
(0.005) (0.005)
log(AUM) 0.063∗∗∗ 0.064∗∗∗
(0.004) (0.006)
Age at Start 0.007∗∗∗ 0.008∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.002)
Firm Investment Advisory 0.012 0.018∗∗
(0.008) (0.008)
Mutual Fund Retailer −0.0001 0.002
(0.003) (0.006)
VLA 0.008∗ 0.009
(0.004) (0.006)
Private Placements 0.017∗∗∗ 0.019∗∗∗
(0.002) (0.004)
Any Debt Securities 0.010∗∗∗ 0.009∗
(0.003) (0.005)
Start-Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Start-State Fixed Effects Yes Yes
Observations 346,389 321,144
R2 0.043 0.042
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Table 3.10: Panel Tests of Oversight Proxies on Complaint Rates
Linear fixed effects models where the dependent variable, the number of complaints a rep-
resentative received, is measured in year t, while all explanatory variables are measured in
year t−1. Firm Size and Branch Size are the number of reps registered at a firm or branch,
respectively. Solo Firm and Solo Branch are indicators for whether the firm or branch has
only one registered rep. Unsupervised is an indicator for whether the rep’s supervisor is
located at a different branch. Standard errors clustered by year and individual in column 1,
and clustered by year, zip code, and individual in columns 2 and 3 are in parentheses.
(1) (2) (3)
Advisor 0.005∗∗∗ 0.005∗∗∗ 0.006∗∗∗
(0.001) (0.001) (0.001)
log(Firm Size) 0.001∗∗ 0.001∗∗
(0.0003) (0.0003)
log(Branch Size) 0.00004 0.0001
(0.0001) (0.0001)
Solo Firm 0.001 0.00005
(0.001) (0.001)
Solo Branch 0.00003 −0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0002)
Private Residence −0.0003 −0.0003
(0.0004) (0.0005)
Unsupervised 0.0002 0.0001
(0.0002) (0.0003)
Fiduciary State −0.010
(0.012)
log(Firm Size):log(Branch Size) −0.00001 −0.00001
(0.00002) (0.00001)
Advisor:Fid State −0.0001
(0.0004)
Age, Exp, Sex, AUM Yes Yes Yes
Year Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes
Zip Code Fixed Effects No Yes Yes
Observations 3,409,635 3,409,635 3,447,948
R2 0.005 0.011 0.011
Note: ∗p<0.1; ∗∗p<0.05; ∗∗∗p<0.01
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Chapter 4
Selection vs Contagion: Influence by
Peers
Do co-workers spread their behavior to one another?1 There is a significant literature
examining financial misconduct and its harms, largely following Becker (1968) in
framing misconduct as a cost-benefit tradeoff by individuals or organizations, without
reference to social networks or peer interactions. While highly useful, this is not a
complete picture of misconduct.
We test empirically for evidence of contagion2 in financial misconduct. Some
empirical studies have demonstrated peer effects in related financial decisions, such
as stock market participation (Brown, Ivković, Smith, and Weisbenner, 2008; Hong,
Kubik, and Stein, 2004; Hvide and Östberg, 2015), entrepreneurship (Lerner and
Malmendier, 2013), and corporate policies (Shue, 2013). Papers such as Glaeser,
Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (1996) and Posner (1997) show that optimal enforcement
policies are very different when contagion is economically significant. In our case,
following the method of Glaeser, Sacerdote, and Scheinkman (2003), we find a social
multiplier of 1.59, meaning that a single case of misconduct produces an additional
0.59 cases through contagion.
While several other papers have explored misconduct at the firm level (Bizjak,
Lemmon, and Whitby, 2009; Brown, 2011; Kedia, Koh, and Rajgopal, 2015; Parsons,
Sulaeman, and Titman, 2015), we focus on individual misconduct. An advantage of
individual misconduct is that it allows for cleaner identification of peer effects, which
is not feasible without accurate identification of peer groups (Manski, 1993).
1This chapter contains material developed in conjunction with Stephen Dimmock and William
Gerken and some portions are included in Dimmock, Gerken, and Graham (2016). I use ’we’ instead
of ’I’ to indicate that the design and estimation of the tests described was a joint effort.
2I use the terms contagion, influence, and peer effects interchangeably to refer to a causal effect
on behavior due to association.
27
4.1 Design
The principle issue in estimating peer effects is in disentangling selection from in-
fluence. Manski (1993, 2000) describes the issue in broad terms, but it can simply
stated that when individuals can choose which people they associate with, distinguish-
ing between causal effects on an individual (often termed influence or contagion) and
individuals choosing to associate with similar people3 (often termed homophily or the
reflection problem). What appears at first glance to be a change in behavior due
to association may simply be the revealing of one’s type or preferences. Shalizi and
Thomas (2011) demonstrate how difficult separating homophily and contagion are in
an empirical setting: Networks constructed purely through selection mechanisms re-
liably pass tests intended to identify contagion and vice versa. Manski (1993) makes
it clear that accurately identifying peer groups is crucial, and that causal effects can-
not be distinguished from endogenous selection if the formation of peer groups is
correlated with the outcome we wish to study.
The structure of the financial advice industry gives us several valuable tools with
which we address the problem of endogenous selection. First, advisors are grouped
into geographically distinct branches, and we observe the street address of each
branch. As most branches are not very large—Table 4.1 shows that the average
branch in our sample has less than twenty advisors—we can be reasonably certain
that advisors working at the same branch are familiar with each other. Second, advi-
sory firms periodically merge, and when they merge geographically close branches are
often merged into a single branch. This provides an exogenous shock to an advisor’s
group of peers, on the assumption that individual advisors have little or no input into
firm-level merger decisions.
It is possible that firm-level merger decisions and misconduct are endogenously
related—firms may choose to merge based in part on each others’ misconduct rates.
However, because merging is a firm-level decision and not a branch-level decision, we
can control for firm-level characteristics (including those related to merger decisions)
by including merger-firm fixed effects: The target and the acquirer in a merger each
have a fixed effect. Since we identify a merger as happening at a specific point in
time, merger-firm fixed effects subsume time fixed effects as well, eliminating any
time trends or time-specific shocks to misconduct from our analysis. Because we use
branches of firms to identify peer groups and control for firm-level effects, our tests
rely on comparisons between branches within the same firm; our design does not allow
us to analyze firms with only one branch.
We structure our main test in a predictive manner: The dependent variable of
our regressions is post-merger misconduct, and all the predictors are measured pre-
merger. This avoids mechanical biases that could arise in contemporaneous designs.
This design also mirrors the problem from an investor’s perspective, asking how likely
an advisor is to engage in misconduct in the future given information about the past
and present.
3Egan, Matvos, and Seru (2016) find that misconduct by financial advisors is not uniformly
distributed, but instead appears to be concentrated in certain firms and counties.
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4.1.1 Identifying Mergers and Dates
FINRA offers firms a convenient method for dealing with many advisors transferring
from one entity to another, known as the Mass Transfer Program. An advisor’s
U5 (termination notice) form will list the reason for termination as a mass transfer,
allowing us to identify mergers in the data. We then hand-check each event to ensure
that a merger is the cause of the mass transfer; we find that this method reliably
identifies mergers. Because the mass transfer program is only open to transfers of at
least fifty advisors, this method may not identify mergers between very small firms
or acquisitions of very small firms by large firms, but many of these very small firms
had only one branch, meaning that they cannot be estimated in our design. Firms
that advisors leave due to a mass transfer are considered target firms, and the firm
that advisors begin working for immediately after the transfer are considered to be
the acquiring firms.
Some of the mergers in our sample are between very large firms which, due to
organizational complexity, conduct multiple transfers in the course of merging oper-
ations. These transfers often take place at different dates. In these cases, we take
the earliest transfer date as the date of the merger. We observe post-merger em-
ployment one hundred days after the merger date to ensure that we capture advisors’
employment correctly. Because of variation in filing dates on U4 and U5 forms, we ob-
serve pre-merger employment thirty days before the merger date. The merger period,
(−30, 100) where 0 is the merger date, is not included in our measures of pre-merger
or post-merger misconduct.
Except for some robustness tests, we use three-year periods (or windows) around
the merger to construct measures of misconduct. The three year pre-merger window
ends at day −30 and the three year post-merger window begins on day 100. Table
4.9 shows that using different window lengths does not affect our results significantly.
4.1.2 Measures of Misconduct
Observing employment both before and after the merger allows us to observe peer
groups before and after the exogenous shock, and to construct measures of misconduct
based on who an advisor worked with before the merger, and who an advisor was
introduced to by the merger. We begin by totaling the number of complaints the
advisors in each group received during the pre-merger period, and scaling that number
by the size of the group (the number of advisors). This produces a misconduct rate.
We then create an indicator variable equal to one if that rate is above the mean for
all such groups, excluding branches with no misconduct at all. For an advisor’s pre-
merger peer group, we refer to this indicator as Original Branch High Misconduct,
and for the peers introduced by the merger—our key variable of interest—we refer
to it as Introduced Branch High Misconduct. Results are very similar if we instead
use rates instead of high-rate indicators, or if we use indicators equal to one if any
member of the group received a complaint.
For each advisor, we create an indicator equal to one if the advisor received a
complaint during the pre-merger period (Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy)
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and an indicator equal to one if the advisor received a complaint in the post-merger
period (the dependent variable in most tests). We also create a count of the number
of complaints an advisor received in the post-merger period for use in a negative
binomial model.
4.2 Descriptive Statistics
Table 4.1 describes target and acquirer firms, branches, and advisors. Acquirer firms
are generally larger, with more advisors (192.0 vs 124.2 advisors on average) and more
advisors per branch (16.0 vs 7.7). Target firms, however, have more distinct branches
(16.1 vs 12.0). A majority of the advisors in our sample are employed at acquirer firms
(91,569 vs 59,264). Target advisors are somewhat more experienced (11.0 year vs 9.8),
manage more assets ($88.1 million vs $80.0 million), and are slightly older (41.6 years
vs 39.3 years of age). The proportion of advisors that are male is essentially equal
(71.0% for acquirers vs 71.1% for targets).
Table 4.2 describes misconduct at the individual and branch levels. Slightly more
than 1% of advisors engaged in misconduct during the three year pre-merger period,
whereas about 1.4% did so in the post-merger period. The increase is largely due
to the financial crisis appearing in more post-merger periods than pre-merger peri-
ods, and is absorbed in multivariate tests by fixed effects. 12.5% of advisors’ original
branches had an above average rate of misconduct, while 14.7% of advisors’ intro-
duced branches had above average misconduct rates. The third panel of Table 4.2
describes the distribution of payouts made to settle a complaint or were awarded
by an arbitration panel. While the mean is approximately $430 thousand dollars,
the median is $50 thousand. Less than 10% of payouts are of $10,000 or less, and
about 10% are greater than $425,000. In 7.5% of cases, settlement amounts were not
disclosed.
4.3 Estimating the Effect of Co-Workers on Miscon-
duct
Using mergers between firms to identify the introduction of advisors to one another,
we estimate the effect of co-workers on an advisor’s propensity to engage in miscon-
duct. Table 4.3 contains results for three different estimators: a conditional logit,
linear fixed effects, and a negative binomial model. Each model includes controls for
age, experience in the industry, sex, assets under management, missing demographic
information, whether the advisor was located at the firm’s main office, whether the
advisor was the only advisor registered at their branch prior to the merger (Solo Orig-
inal Branch), and (log) branch size before the merger and of the introduced branch.
We also control for whether the advisor engaged in misconduct prior to the merger,
and whether the advisor’s pre-merger peers had a history of misconduct.
Column (1) of Table 4.3 shows coefficients and z-scores for the conditional logit
model, where the dependent variables is an indicator variable equal to one if the
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advisor engaged in misconduct in the post-merger period, and merger-firm fixed effects
are conditioned out of the model. This is our primary or main test of the peer
influence hypothesis. The main coefficient of interest is Introduced Branch High
Misconduct, which is 0.313 and highly significant. This indicates that advisors who
are introduced to peers that have a history of misconduct are 37% (e0.313 = 1.3675)
more likely to engage in misconduct after the merger. This is an economically large
effect, indicating that peers significantly affect each others’ propensity for misconduct
and that working with unethical people can lead to unethical behavior. The coefficient
for Original Branch High Misconduct is even larger at 0.488, but we cannot interpret
this causally—because an advisor chose to work with those individuals (and they
him), we can only say that pre-merger peer behavior is strongly correlated with post-
merger individual behavior. Finally, Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy is
very large: 1.392, which intuitively indicates that one’s own behavior in the past is
highly predictive of one’s future behavior.
The second and third columns of Table 4.3 report the results of a linear fixed effects
model and a negative binomial model, respectively. Like the conditional logit model,
the dependent variable for the linear fixed effects model is an indicator equal to one
if the advisor engaged in misconduct in the post-merger period. The results are very
similar to those in the conditional logit, where Introduced Branch High Misconduct is
positive and significant, as are Original Branch High Misconduct and Pre-Merger In-
dividual Misconduct Dummy. None the signs on the control variables change relative
to the conditional logit, and except for age (which becomes statistically significant in
the linear fixed effects model), all have the same statistical significance. The negative
binomial model in column (3) uses the number of separate misconduct events in the
post-merger period as its dependent variable instead of an indicator for whether this
is greater than zero. The results in column (3) are nearly indistinguishable from the
those of the conditional logit. The final, fourth column is also a conditional logit
with the same controls as the first, except that we add an interaction to our main
variable of interest: We include an Above Median indicator, equal to one if the intro-
duced branch had an above median rate of misconduct, relative to other introduced
branches with high misconduct. The resulting coefficient is positive but small and sta-
tistically insignificant, suggesting that the effect of peer misconduct does not become
significantly stronger as peer misconduct becomes more pervasive.
In order to ensure that our design works as intended and that the merger-firm fixed
effects control for any firm-level endogeneity, we construct a placebo test, reported in
Table 4.4. In the first column, we estimate a logit identical to our conditional logit
model in column (1) Table 4.3, except that fixed effects are omitted and the dependent
variable is pre-merger misconduct instead of post-merger misconduct. Introduced
Branch High Misconduct is positive and significant, which should not be possible
because it means that peers met in the future affect behavior in the present (or put
another way, that the present affects the past). This suggests that, without the
fixed effects, there may be selection biases at the firm level affecting our results.
In column (2), however, we include merger-firm fixed effects (as a conditional logit
model), and the relation between advisor’s behavior and the behavior of future peers
is not significantly different from zero. This provides support for our identification
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strategy based on mergers and firm-level fixed effects within the merger.
4.4 Similarity and Contagion
It is possible that our results in Table 4.3 are driven by other branch-level variation,
such as variation in oversight. To address this, we examine effects from peers that
are ethnically similar, on the assumption that advisors of the same ethnicity are
more likely to associate with one another, and thus have a larger effect on each
other’s behavior.4 We use a classifier developed by Ambekar, Ward, Mohammed,
Male, and Skiena (2009) to determine advisors’ ethnicities from their names, and
then construct indicator variables for advisors’ ethnic classifications. We then create
an indicator equal to one if the member of an advisor’s introduced branch that are of
the same ethnicity engaged in misconduct in the pre-merger period (Same Ethnicity
Misconduct). Some advisors cannot be classified, resulting in a somewhat smaller
sample size available for tests.
Table 4.5 reports the results of adding ethnicity fixed effects and an interaction
between Introduced Branch High Misconduct and Same Ethnicity Misconduct to our
model from column 1 Table 4.3. If our results are driven primarily by peer influence
and not other factors, we would expect that similar peers would have greater influence
than others, and so the interaction with Same Ethnicity Misconduct would be positive
and significant. Table 4.5 has exactly this result—the interaction has a coefficient of
0.222 and is statistically significant. Introduced Branch High Misconduct remains
economically and statistically significant with a coefficient of 0.257, meaning that less
similar peers still have influence, but not as much as those in the same ethnicity. Any
explanation of our results that is not based on peer effects must explain not only why
introduced peers’ behavior is correlated with an advisor’s misconduct, but also why
this is modulated by ethnicity.
4.5 Geographic Variation and Branch Size
Since branches are generally merged due to similar geography, it is possible that ad-
visors are already familiar with introduced peers, and that effects may be confounded
by a similar regulatory environment. To address this, we add geographic controls, in
the form of merger-firm-state and merger-firm-county fixed effects to our main test.
Table 4.6 reports these results in columns (1) and (2), respectively. The estimates are
very similar to those in column (1) of Table 4.3; Introduced Branch High Misconduct
remains positive and significant with coefficients of 0.290 and 0.321. The coefficients
on Original Branch High Misconduct and Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct are also
similar to those in our main test. This clearly indicates that geographic variation
cannot account for our results.
4Bertrand, Luttmer, and Mullainathan (2000) and McPherson, Smith-Lovin, and Cook (2001)
find that ethnicity is one of the strongest factors in forming social groups, and Pool, Stoffman, and
Yonker (2015) find that stronger peer effects within ethnicities.
32
It is possible that our size controls fail to account for non-linearity in the effect
of branch size on misconduct, such as economies of scale in supervision. This would
result in across-branch, within-merger variation that could account for our main effect.
To check for this, we replace the merger-firm fixed effects of the main specification
with merger-firm-size category fixed effects, allowing for separate effects of large and
small branches. Branches are divided into large and small using the median in-sample
branch size. The results are reported in column (3) of Table 4.6, and as before they
are very similar to the results of the main test.
4.6 Across-Branch Variation in Monitoring and Su-
pervision
The introduced branch misconduct rate may proxy for supervision or monitoring
at the branch level, which may vary substantially from one branch to another. To
address this, we make a series of modifications to our main specification, the results of
which are reported in Table 4.7. At the broadest level, target advisors may simply be
adapting to the supervision at the acquiring branch, which the introduced branch’s
misconduct rate simply reflects. If this is the case, we would expect the effect of the
introduced branch to be driven almost entirely by target advisors, with approximately
no effect on acquirer advisors. Column (1) adds an interaction between Introduced
Branch High Misconduct and an Acquirer indicator. The interaction is positive, but
not significant, meaning that peer influence is insignificantly stronger for acquirer
advisors, which is not consistent with adaptation to new supervision, or, alternatively,
to adaptation to the acquiring branch’s social norms.
Some studies, such as Agarwal and Hauswald (2010), find that distance from a
firm’s headquarters is (negatively) correlated with monitoring due to increased in-
dependence. To test for this, we introduce an indicator equal to one if a branch is
within 100 miles of the firm’s headquarters (Close to HQ). The result from adding this
indicator and interacting it with Introduced Branch High Misconduct are reported
in column (2) Table 4.7. The indicator is positive but not significant, and the inter-
action is very small (-0.005) and insignificant, meaning that distance from the firm’s
headquarters cannot plausibly account for our results. The other coefficients are very
similar to those from the main test.
In columns (3), (4), and (5) of Table 4.7 we exclude three subsets of observations
that could potentially confound our results. In column (3), we exclude observations
from post-merger branches where there has been a pre-merger complaint citing a fail-
ure to supervise against any advisor, because lax supervision varies from one branch
to another and could account for the appearance of influence. In column (4), we
exclude observations from post-merger branches where there has been a regulatory
action in the pre-merger period to ensure that common exposure to regulatory actions
does not drive our results. Finally, in column (5) we exclude from the sample any
merger where the same lawyer has represented clients against both the target and
the acquirer, to ensure that lawyers targeting particular branches does not drive our
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results.5 In each of these subsamples, the estimated coefficients are very similar to
those in the main test, and their statistical significance is similar. This means that
across-branch variation in monitoring and supervision, even external “supervision”
from litigators, cannot explain our results.
4.7 Additional Robustness Tests
In order to rule out other possible factors or biases, we conduct a series of robustness
tests, reported in Table 4.8 and Table 4.9. Specifically, we exclude misconduct settled
by small dollar amounts, divide the sample into early and late periods, consider
a delayed post-merger period, include advisors that exited their firm prior to the
merger, and estimate our main specification using alternative pre-merger and post-
merger periods.
One potential concern is that complaints involving small dollar amounts could
represent nuisance complaints that are not indicative of actual misconduct. To ad-
dress this, exclude complaints settled for less than $50,000 from all of our misconduct
measures and reestimate the main specification in column (1) of Table 4.8. The co-
efficients are very similar to the main result, so our findings cannot be driven by
nuisance complaints that do not represent misconduct.
While our design inherently includes time controls, to ensure that our findings are
not driven by common shocks such as the recent financial crisis, we split our sample
into two subperiods. In column (2) of Table 4.8 we present results using only mergers
from 1999–2005, and in column (3) we use only mergers from 2006–2011. In both
periods, the coefficient on Introduced Branch High Misconduct is positive, significant,
and economically similar to our main result. It is unlikely, then, that our results are
driven by a specific time period.
A key assumption of our tests is that complaints received in the post-merger period
is due to post-merger misconduct. However, it is possible that delays in identifying
an advisor’s misconduct and filing the appropriate complaint could mean that some
post-merger complaints are related to pre-merger behavior, potentially biasing our
results. To address this, in column (4) we present results using a delayed post-merger
period, starting two years after the post-merger period in the main specification.6
The coefficients estimated in column (4) are very similar to those in the main test,
meaning that our results were not biased by possibly including misconduct from before
the merger.
Advisors who exit their firm prior to the merger could be doing so because the
have information about the norms or supervision at the introduced branch. If this is
the case, our results could be affected by selection bias, where advisors that choose
to stay are similar to their introduced branch. We address this by including advisors
that were present at the firm before the merger but were not part of the post-merger
firm in our sample, assigning them to the post-merger branch they would have joined
5We use the Westlaw International Database to identify cases and lawyers names.
6This means that the post-merger period in this test begins two years and one hundred days after
the merger.
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had they stayed. Presented in column (5) of Table 4.8, these results are very similar
to those of our main specification. We find no evidence that advisor ’survival’ can
account for our results.
Finally, it is possible that our choice of three year windows before and after the
merger somehow drives the results of the main specification. To test for this, we create
alternate windows of one, two, and five years around the mergers in our sample and
reestimate the main specification. We also introduce pre-merger windows of ten years
and one hundred years (capturing an advisors’ entire history in the industry). Table
4.9 shows the coefficient on Introduced Branch High Misconduct and it’s z-score for
every combination of one, two, three, and five pre-merger and post-merger windows,
and the ten and one hundred year pre-merger windows. With the exception of using
a one year window on both sides of the merger, every estimated coefficient is positive,
significant, and economically similar to our main result. This demonstrates that the
choice of window length does not significantly affect the results.
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4.8 Tables
Table 4.1: Summary Statistics: Firms, Branches, and Advisors
This table provides summary statistics of firm and advisor characteristics for the
merger sample. The sample consists of 477 mergers during the period August 1999
to December 2011. Statistics are reported separately for acquirer and target firms.
Assets under management (AUM) is summarized using only those observations for
which Meridian IQ has data.
Acquirer Target
Financial Advisory Firms
Number of Firms 477 477
Average Financial Advisors per Firm 192.0 124.2
Branches
Number of Branches 5,737 7,693
Average Branches per Firm 12.0 16.1
Average Financial Advisors per Branch 16.0 7.7
Individual Financial Advisors
Number of Financial Advisors 91,569 59,264
Experience 9.8 11.0
Assets Under Management (AUM) in $ millions 80.0 88.1
Male 71.0% 71.1%
Age 39.3 41.6
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Table 4.2: Misconduct by Financial Advisors
This table provides summary statistics of misconduct by financial advisors in the
merger sample. Panel A tabulates the number of misconduct events and percentage
of advisors that commit misconduct in the three year windows before and after the
merger. Pre-merger period is the three years prior to the merger. Post-merger pe-
riod is the three years after the merger. Panel B reports the misconduct statistics
at the branch level. Original Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average
percentage of the advisor’s Original Branch co-workers committed misconduct dur-
ing the pre-merger period. Introduced Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above
average percentage of the advisor’s new co-workers from the Introduced Branch com-
mitted misconduct during the pre-merger period. Panel C presents the Dollar Value
Distribution of Settlements and Awards. Settlements are not disclosed for 7.5% of
complaints.
Panel A: Individual Misconduct Summary Statistics
Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct 1,867 1.02%
Post-Merger Individual Misconduct 2,812 1.40%
Panel B: Branch Misconduct Summary Statistics
Original Branch High Misconduct 12.5%
Introduced Branch High Misconduct 14.7%
Panel C: Dollar Value Distribution of Settlements and Awards
Mean $430,338
10th Percentile $12,500
25th Percentile $22,826
Median $50,000
75th Percentile $150,000
90th Percentile $425,294
% Settlement Not Disclosed 7.5%
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Table 4.3: Mergers, Introduced Co-Workers, and Financial Misconduct
Columns (1) and (4) report estimates from a conditional logit model grouped by
merger-firm. Column (2) reports estimates from a linear model with merger-firm
fixed effects. Column (3) reports estimates from a negative binomial model with
merger-firm fixed effects. In columns (1), (2) and (4), the dependent variable equals
1 if the advisor commits misconduct in the post-merger period (three year window).
In column (3), the dependent variable is the count of misconduct events.Introduced
Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage of the advisor’s new
co-workers from the Introduced Branch committed misconduct during the pre-merger
period. Original Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage
of the advisor’s Original Branch co-workers committed misconduct during the pre-
merger period. Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy equals 1 if the advisor
committed misconduct before the merger (three year window). Above Median equals
1 if, among the Introduced Branch High Misconduct branches, the advisor’s Introduced
Branch has an above median misconduct rate. The models also include controls for
advisor age, experience, gender, assets under management, the number of advisors
in the Original Branch and Introduced Branch, and branch type. Z-scores clustered
by merger are in brackets in columns one and two. Z-scores without clustering are
reported in column (3). The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%,
5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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Cond. Logit Linear F.E. Count Model Cond. Logit
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Introduced Branch High Misconduct 0.313*** 0.005*** 0.269*** 0.275**
[4.01] [2.80] [3.73] [2.12]
Introduced Branch High Misconduct × Above Median 0.051
[0.29]
Original Branch High Misconduct 0.488*** 0.010*** 0.482*** 0.488***
[7.11] [5.85] [9.34] [7.07]
Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy 1.392*** 0.077*** 1.338*** 1.392***
[12.17] [8.51] [16.12] [12.12]
Standardized Age 0.040 0.003*** 0.032 0.039
[1.47] [5.00] [1.02] [1.46]
Standardized Experience 0.206*** 0.003*** 0.206*** 0.206**
[7.82] [6.20] [7.76] [7.85]
Male Dummy 1.306*** 0.014*** 1.283*** 1.306
[20.26] [7.52] [16.63] [20.27]
Standardized AUM 0.023** 0.002** 0.019** 0.023**
[2.51] [2.13] [1.96] [2.51]
Missing Demographic Data Dummy 0.493*** 0.004*** 0.487*** 0.493***
[4.55] [5.59] [4.56] [4.55]
Main Office Dummy -0.695*** -0.004*** -0.657*** -0.696***
[2.71] [2.59] [3.72] [2.70]
Solo Original Branch -0.214 -0.003 -0.220 -0.701
[1.18] [1.01] [1.42] [3.94]
log(Original Branch Size) -0.234*** -0.003*** -0.225*** -0.234***
[7.34] [3.93] [10.48] [7.37]
log(Introduced Branch Size) -0.166*** -0.002*** -0.160*** -0.165***
[5.84] [5.49] [7.58] [5.76]
Merger-Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 113,963 150,746 113,963 113,963
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Table 4.4: Placebo Tests of Introduced Co-Workers and Financial Misconduct
Column (1) reports estimates from a logit model of pre-merger misconduct (three
year window before the merger). Column (2) reports estimates from a conditional
logit model of pre-merger misconduct (three year window before the merger) with
merger-firm fixed effects. For both models, the dependent variable equals 1 if the
advisor committed misconduct before the merger (three year window). Introduced
Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage of the advisor’s new
co-workers from the Introduced Branch committed misconduct during the pre-merger
period. Original Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage
of the advisor’s Original Branch co-workers committed misconduct during the pre-
merger period. Before Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy equals 1 if the
advisor committed misconduct before the merger window (any time before the three
year pre-merger window). The models also include controls for advisor age, expe-
rience, gender, assets under management, the number of advisors in the Original
Branch and Introduced Branch, and branch type. Z-scores clustered by merger are
in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1%
levels, respectively.
(1) (2)
Introduced Branch High Misconduct 0.595*** 0.123
[7.77] [1.53]
Original Branch High Misconduct 1.258*** 0.548***
[9.28] [3.76]
Before Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy 1.178*** 1.035***
[11.51] [12.50]
Advisor and Advisory Firm Controls Yes Yes
Merger-Firm Fixed Effects No Yes
Number of Observations 150,746 102,691
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Table 4.5: Similarity and Contagion
This table reports coefficients from a conditional logit model in which the dependent
variable equals 1 if the advisor commits misconduct in the 3 year post-merger period.
Introduced Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage of the
advisor’s new co-workers from the Introduced Branch committed misconduct during
the pre-merger period. Original Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average
percentage of the advisor’s Original Branch co-workers committed misconduct dur-
ing the pre-merger period. Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy equals 1 if the
advisor committed misconduct before the merger (three year window). Same Ethnic-
ity Misconduct Dummy equals 1 if an advisor’s new colleagues of the same ethnicity
(classified using the approach from Ambekar, Ward, Mohammed, Male, and Skiena,
2009) committed misconduct before the merger (three year window). ln(Merger Same
Ethnicity Network Size) is the logarithm of the number of advisors of same ethnicity
in the Introduced Branch. Same Ethnicity Misconduct Dummy and ln(Merger Same
Ethnicity Network Size) are included as controls, but not reported. The models also
include controls for advisor age, experience, gender, assets under management, the
number of advisors in the Original Branch and Introduced Branch, and branch type.
Z-scores clustered by merger are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote
significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Introduced Branch High Misconduct 0.257**
[2.50]
Introduced Branch High Misconduct × Same Ethnicity Misconduct 0.222**
[2.03]
Original Branch High Misconduct 0.442***
[5.77]
Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy 1.280***
[8.85]
Ethnicity Fixed Effects Yes
Advisor and Advisory Firm Controls Yes
Merger-Firm Fixed Effects Yes
Number of Observations 78,234
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Table 4.6: Geography and Branch Size
This table reports coefficients from conditional logit models in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the advisor commits
misconduct in the 3 year post-merger period. Introduced Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage of
the advisor’s new co-workers from the Introduced Branch committed misconduct during the pre-merger period. Original Branch
High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage of the advisor’s Original Branch co-workers committed misconduct
during the pre-merger period. Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy equals 1 if the advisor committed misconduct before
the merger (three year window). In column (1), the model includes Merger-Firm-State Fixed Effects (separate fixed effects for
each state in which branches are located for each firm in each merger). In column (2), the model includes Merger-Firm-County
Fixed Effects (separate fixed effects for each county in which branches are located for each firm in each merger). In column
(3), the model includes Merger-Firm-Median Branch Size Fixed Effects (separate fixed effects for small and large branches for
each firm in each merger). The models also include controls for advisor age, experience, gender, assets under management,
the number of advisors in the Original Branch and Introduced Branch, and branch type. Z-scores clustered by merger are in
brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Geographic Branch Size
(1) (2) (3)
Introduced Branch High Misconduct 0.290*** 0.321** 0.288***
[3.00] [2.08] [3.62]
Original Branch High Misconduct 0.503*** 0.571*** 0.483***
[6.31] [4.71] [6.39]
Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy 1.432*** 1.492*** 1.395***
[11.32] [11.05] [12.33]
Advisor and Advisory Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes
Merger-Firm Fixed Effects Subsumed Subsumed Subsumed
Merger-Firm-State Fixed Effects Yes No No
Merger-Firm-County Fixed Effects No Yes No
Merger-Firm-Median Branch Size Fixed Effects No No Yes
Number of Observations 84,457 70,614 102,274
42
Table 4.7: Across-Branch Variation in Monitoring and Supervision
This table reports coefficients from conditional logit models in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the advisor commits
misconduct in the 3 year post-merger period. Introduced Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage of
the advisor’s new co-workers from the Introduced Branch committed misconduct during the pre-merger period. Original Branch
High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage of the advisor’s Original Branch co-workers committed misconduct
during the pre-merger period. Column (1) includes an interaction of Introduced Branch High Misconduct with a dummy equal
to one if the advisor initially worked for the Acquiring firm [note: the direct effect of the Acquirer dummy is subsumed by the
Merger-Firm Fixed Effects]. Column (2) includes an interaction of Introduced Branch High Misconduct with a dummy equal
to 1 if the advisor’s branch is located within 100 miles of the acquirer’s main office. In column (3), the sample excludes all
branches with any history of failure to supervise (in the pre-merger window). In column (4), the sample excludes all branches
with any history of regulatory actions (in the pre-merger window). In column (5), we exclude all mergers in which the same
lawyer represents claims against advisors from both the target firm and from the acquirer firm. The models include Merger-Firm
Fixed Effects. The models also include controls for advisor age, experience, gender, assets under management, the number of
advisors in the Original Branch and Introduced Branch, and branch type. Z-scores clustered by merger are in brackets. The
symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
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(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Introduced Branch High Misconduct 0.244** 0.308*** 0.271*** 0.272*** 0.349***
[2.02] [3.35] [3.24] [2.73] [4.16]
Original Branch High Misconduct 0.493*** 0.492*** 0.436*** 0.425*** 0.487***
[7.11] [7.29] [6.30] [4.83] [6.47]
Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy 1.394*** 1.386*** 1.372*** 1.385*** 1.295***
[12.04] [11.56] [13.09] [12.79] [15.43]
Introduced Branch High Misconduct × Acquirer 0.159
[0.80]
Introduced Branch High Misconduct × Close to HQ -0.005
[0.03]
Close to HQ 0.128
[1.27]
Advisor and Advisory Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Merger-Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Exclude Branches with History of Failure to Supervise No No Yes No No
Exclude Branches with History of Regulatory Actions No No No Yes No
Exclude Mergers with Overlap of Complainant Laywer No No No No Yes
Number of Observations 113,963 104,895 102,565 77,023 107,706
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Table 4.8: Additional Robustness Tests
This table reports coefficients from conditional logit models in which the dependent variable equals 1 if the advisor commits
misconduct in the 3 year post-merger period. Introduced Branch High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage of
the advisor’s new co-workers from the Introduced Branch committed misconduct during the pre-merger period. Original Branch
High Misconduct equals 1 if an above average percentage of the advisor’s Original Branch co-workers committed misconduct
during the pre-merger period. Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy equals 1 if the advisor committed misconduct before
the merger (three year window). In column (1), we exclude any complaints with settlements of less than $50,000 in the
calculation of the misconduct variables. In column (2), we include only observations from mergers in 1999-2005. In column
(3), we include only observations from mergers in 2006-2011. In column (4), the dependent variable is misconduct in a three
year window that starts two years and 100 days after the merger. In column (5), we append to the sample by counterfactually
assigning all advisors that exited before the completion of the merger to the post-merger branch joined by the plurality of
their Original Branch co-workers. The models include Merger-Firm Fixed Effects. The models also include controls for advisor
age, experience, gender, assets under management, the number of advisors in the Original Branch and Introduced Branch, and
branch type. Z-scores clustered by merger are in brackets. The symbols *, **, and *** denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and
1% levels, respectively.
Exclude Delayed Include
Small $ Early Late Post Exiting
Settlements Sample Sample Period Advisors
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5)
Introduced Branch High Misconduct 0.267*** 0.241** 0.362*** 0.337*** 0.351***
[2.76] [2.21] [3.47] [4.00] [4.11]
Original Branch High Misconduct 0.499*** 0.504*** 0.488*** 0.462*** 0.491***
[9.10] [4.63] [5.44] [6.24] [7.07]
Pre-Merger Individual Misconduct Dummy 1.517*** 1.748*** 1.097*** 1.154*** 1.387***
[12.54] [13.99] [12.49] [9.74] [11.48]
Advisor and Advisory Firm Controls Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Merger-Firm Fixed Effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Number of Observations 113,963 48,340 65,623 105,126 116,223
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Table 4.9: Alternate Windows
This table reports the Introduced Branch High Misconduct coefficient from models of
post-merger misconduct using alternate pre-merger and post-merger windows. The
models and variable definitions are based on the specification in Table 3 column 1
and other than the window size are otherwise identical. The symbols *, **, and ***
denote significance at the 10%, 5%, and 1% levels, respectively.
Coefficient of Introduced Branch High Misconduct
Post-Merger Window Length
1-year 2-year 3-year 5-year
1-year Pre-Merger Window 0.217 0.291*** 0.308*** 0.324***
[1.43] [2.74] [3.41] [3.98]
2-year Pre-Merger Window 0.324*** 0.241** 0.258*** 0.321***
[2.83] [2.48] [3.02] [3.86]
3-year Pre-Merger Window 0.301** 0.270*** 0.313*** 0.345***
[2.55] [3.14] [4.01] [4.54]
5-year Pre-Merger Window 0.376*** 0.294*** 0.215** 0.225**
[3.37] [3.16] [2.17] [2.17]
10-year Pre-Merger Window 0.353*** 0.335*** 0.296*** 0.274***
[3.12] [3.24] [2.72] [2.69]
Full Pre-Merger Window 0.418*** 0.415*** 0.426*** 0.406***
[3.20] [4.43] [4.64] [5.12]
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Chapter 5
Conclusion
Financial advisors are a large and important part of the financial industry, worth
studying in their own right due to their role as intermediaries for retail investment.
Additionally, they are a useful setting for studying broader behaviors by individuals
and organizations because of the industry structure and disclosure rules.
In Chapter 3, I examine the difference in misconduct rates between brokers and
RIAs, which I refer to as the advisor effect, and find that the mix products and
services offered by their employers appears to account for the difference, but that
fiduciary standards do not appear to affect rates of misconduct. I find that the
geographic location of a representative does not explain the advisor effect, either at
the zip code level or when accounting for location in a state that imposes fiduciary
duties on brokers. Further, the advisor effect cannot be explained by firm or branch
factors such as size or how closely the representative is supervised.
Recent discussions in the media (Stulberg, 2015, for example) and a proposal by
the US Department of Labor (introduced in February of 2015 and finalized in July
of 2016) to impose fiduciary duties on brokers that handle retirement products make
understanding how a fiduciary standard affects misconduct valuable. If, as Gough
(2014) suggests, the advisor effect is due to the fiduciary standard lowering the bar
for successful customer complaints, then investors might benefit significantly from
stricter standards of conduct for brokers. However, I find that brokers and advisors
are frequently engaged in different activities, and while there is overlap between the
two groups, the advisors’ higher rate of customer complaints is likely due to different
products and services offered by advisors relative to brokers. This suggests that
the benefits of imposing a fiduciary standard on brokers will be small, and that
stricter professional standards are unlikely to have an economically significant effect
on brokers’ misconduct rates.
Finally, advisors receive complaints at a higher rate than brokers in several im-
portant areas, such as mutual fund sales, and advisors employed at advisory firms
have a much higher rate of complaints than others. This indicates that efforts to ad-
dress misconduct by brokers is missing the larger problem of misconduct by registered
investment advisors, which appears to be more severe.
In Chapter 4, I—in conjunction with Stephen Dimmock and William Gerken—
examine the effects of peer interactions on misconduct rates. Using mergers between
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firms and the branch structure prevalent in the industry, we are able to distinguish
between contagion—causal peer effects on one another—and endogenous selection
or homophily—people’s preference for associating with others that are similar. We
find that advisors influence each others’ propensity to engage in misconduct, and that
working with peers that have a history of misconduct increases an advisor’s likelihood
of engaging in misconduct in the future. This effect is stronger for individuals that
have a similar ethnic background, indicating that regulatory or supervisory mech-
anisms cannot explain our results. Further, our results are robust to a variety of
alternative specifications and controls, such as geography, monitoring and supervi-
sion, functional form, and the length of the time periods used.
Our results are relevant to firms, investors, and regulators. Firms desiring better
oversight and management must consider how peer effects fit into their supervision
and compliance policies. Investors who seek an honest financial advisor would be
well served by examining advisors’ peers, who have strong influence over each oth-
ers’ behavior and misconduct. Finally, because contagion is a negative externality,
regulators seeking optimal penalty structures must account for peer effects; optimal
penalties are higher in the case of economically significant peer effects in order to
account for the additional damage misconduct does by spreading itself. Contagion
also highlights the value of suspension and expulsion from the industry: Removing
unethical advisors is likely more effective at preventing the spread of misconduct than
monetary fines.
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